Having people predict whether they will perform a socially normative behavior increases their probability of performing that target action. Recent empirical evidence supports a dissonance-based theoretical explanation for this self-prophecy effect. While the effect is robust, few boundary conditions have been identified. We report two experiments within the dissonance paradigm providing theory-relevant evidence for the moderating effects of self-monitoring on people's susceptibility to self-prophecy. In particular, low self-monitors are more likely than high self-monitors to be influenced by self-prediction regarding normative behaviors. Implications for theory and the practice of social influence are provided.
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A sking people to make a self-prediction regarding a normative behavior influences the performance of that behavior in the future. Since its introduction by Sherman (1980) , this self-prophecy effect has been documented across a wide variety of normative contexts, with demonstrated increases in performing socially desirable actions such as recycling aluminum cans and voting in an election and decreases in undesirable behaviors such as cheating on a take-home exam and implicit gender stereotyping (for a review, see Spangenberg et al. 2003) . The wide variety of effects and consistently moderate effect sizes (Spangenberg and Greenwald 1999) reported in prior research clearly suggest promise for the consistent, wide-scale application of self-prediction to the benefit of society.
While demonstrations of the self-prophecy phenomenon have been reported in the literature during the past several years, only recently has evidence begun to accrue regarding theoretical explication for the effect and under what conditions it manifests. Various theoretical mechanisms have been proposed for the effects of behavioral self-prediction, including script evocation and impression management (Sherman 1980) , cognitive dissonance (Spangenberg 1997; Spangenberg and Greenwald 1999) , attitude accessibility (cf. Morwitz and Fitzsimons 2004) , consistency (Cialdini and Trost 1998) , and norm salience (Sprott, Spangenberg, *The authors contributed equally to this article. Eric R. Spangenberg is dean, Maughmer Chair, and professor of marketing, Washington State University, Pullman, . David E. Sprott is Gardner O. Hart Distinguished Professor and associate professor of marketing, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4730 (dsprott@wsu .edu). The authors thank the editor, associate editor, and two reviewers for input and guidance on this article. They also thank Ronn J. Smith for his assistance in data collection. Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to either author. and Fisher 2003). Given empirical elimination of a number of these explanations and recent experimental support for one , it is reasonably concluded that cognitive dissonance-as viewed through Aronson's self-concept-based conceptualization (1968, 1992 )-underlies the self-prophecy effect.
The dissonance-based view of self-prophecy (see Spangenberg et al. 2003) holds that behavioral self-prediction makes salient social norms associated with the behavior in addition to a person's prior failings to perform the behavior in a socially normative manner. That is, at the time of prediction request, people become simultaneously aware of what they should do as well as what they have done (or have not done) in the past. The typically inconsistent nature of these cognitions (e.g., "I should exercise, I joined a fitness club, but I have not attended it recently") confronts the person's self-concept as a moral, competent, and good person (Aronson 1968 (Aronson , 1992 . Given that a moral, competent, and good person should behave in concert with social norms but likely has not always in the past, cognitive dissonance is thereby elicited through self-prediction. Dissonance then serves as an aversive state, motivating behavior change in concert with social norms (also see Fried and Aronson 1995) . Spangenberg et al. (2003) provided wide-ranging experimental evidence consistent with the dissonance-based explanation of self-prophecy. In two studies, they demonstrated that making a prediction about other people's behavior (a dissonance-reduction mechanism based on social comparison theory) reduced psychological discomfort associated with dissonance (Elliot and Devine 1994) after making a self-prediction. A more elegant, third study found that a traditional means of reducing dissonance through selfaffirmation (Sherman, Nelson, and Steele 2000) had a sim-ilar effect on psychological discomfort. A final study demonstrated that the self-affirmation manipulation also reduced the effect of self-prediction on people's willingness to donate time to the American Cancer Society. Proposed accounts of self-prophecy such as script evocation and attitude accessibility cannot account for the diverse pattern of results; Spangenberg et al. therefore concluded that dissonance underlies self-prophecy. Relatedly, design characteristics of Spangenberg et al.'s research help to further eliminate attitude accessibility for the effects they observed; specifically, conditions in four of their experiments were such that attitudes should have been accessible, but they did not produce effects similar to self-prediction conditions.
Further support for a dissonance-based account of selfprophecy is provided by prior research demonstrating three moderators of self-prediction. Early research by Greenwald and colleagues (reported in Spangenberg and Greenwald 1999) found that moderate (as compared with high or low) prior voting experience produced greater self-prophecy effects on voting behavior. Although these results may reflect ceiling and floor effects, the lack of self-prophecy effects for those high and low in prior turnout can also be interpreted within a dissonance paradigm. Voters with high prior turnout may have been less likely to experience dissonance due to their norm-consistent past behavior, while voters with low prior turnout may have had no established normative beliefs about voting; for both, the important dissonancegenerating mechanisms (i.e., social norms and contrary prior behavior) may have not existed. Another moderator is the nature of the self-prediction itself. Sprott et al. (2004) demonstrated stronger self-prophecy effects for specific (compared with more general) self-predictions and suggested a dissonance-based process such that the discomfort evoked by a specific (vs. general) self-prediction may be less easily attributable to sources other than not performing the criterion behavior. Finally, research by Sprott et al. (2003) showed that self-prophecy effects are greater for those holding stronger, as opposed to weaker, social norms regarding the predicted behavior. This finding also is interpretable from a dissonance perspective, given that the greatest dissonance should manifest for people with the strongest normative beliefs who have not previously lived up to normative standards. Although these moderators are consistent with a dissonance explanation for self-prophecy, identification of additional theory-relevant moderators is important in order to further our understanding regarding theoretical underpinnings for the effect.
SELF-PROPHECY AND SELF-MONITORING
An underlying premise of this article is that the efficacy of self-prophecy depends on individual differences among those making self-predictions. Given that self-monitoring has been shown to moderate the effects of dissonance (e.g., DeBono and Edmonds 1989) and influence the relationships among attitudes, intentions, and behaviors (e.g., Ajzen, Timko, and White 1982; Zanna, Olson, and Fazio 1980) , we focus our attention on this individual difference. The underlying notion of self-monitoring is that a person's behavior is differentially influenced by dispositional and situational factors (e.g., Snyder 1974) . For high self-monitors, behavior is more often influenced by situational factors, while the behavior of low self-monitors is influenced most often by dispositional factors. A premise of much self-monitoring research is that attitudes serve different functions for high and low self-monitors, each group being more persuaded by messages that match the function served by their attitudes. Low self-monitors have consistently been shown to be influenced by messages making appeals to values (i.e., attitudes serving a value-expressive function), while high self-monitors are influenced by appeals to status (i.e., attitudes serving a social-adjustive function; see Lavine and Snyder 1996) , with evidence that attitudes of low self-monitors are more available relative to those of high self-monitors (Kardes et al. 1986) .
A dissonance-based explanation of self-prophecy holds that a values-action discrepancy is made salient by the act of self-prediction regarding a socially normative behavior. In other words, a person completing a prediction is made aware of, and considers, the social norms surrounding the predicted behavior and prior failures to act normatively regarding the behavior. This combination of normative consideration and previous (in)action is argued to confront the self-concept of the person, thereby inducing dissonance. This confrontation of the self-concept should be more effective for low self-monitors because their behaviors and attitudes are generally based on values, in contrast to high self-monitors, who base behaviors and attitudes on situational factors (e.g., DeBono and Edmonds 1989). Further support for this proposed process is provided by research demonstrating that the effects of self-discrepancies (Higgins 1987 ) are related to self-monitoring such that affective states of low (vs. high) self-monitors are negatively influenced by self-discrepancies related to an own (vs. other) viewpoint (Gonnerman et al. 2000) . Our fundamental hypothesis therefore is that the self-prophecy technique is more likely to influence low versus high self-monitors.
High and low self-monitors have been shown to differ regarding cognitive dissonance, a finding bearing upon theoretical explanation of self-prophecy. Snyder and Tanke (1976) showed that low self-monitors were more likely to change their attitudes after writing a counterattitudinal essay than were high self-monitors, reflecting the fact that internal beliefs are more important to low self-monitors and therefore are more susceptible to dissonance. Both low and high selfmonitors may experience dissonance, albeit from different sources. In particular, DeBono and Edmonds (1989) provided evidence that attitudes of high (vs. low) self-monitors were more affected after writing a counterattitudinal essay in opposition to peers and that attitudes of low (vs. high) self-monitors were more influenced after writing an essay opposing their values.
Thus, we propose that low self-monitors should be more likely than high self-monitors to attribute prior failure to behave normatively to their own disposition. By attributing prior failures to themselves, low self-monitors are more likely to have their self-concept threatened by having made a self-prediction and thereby more likely to experience cognitive dissonance. In contrast, high self-monitors are more likely to consider their past failures to perform normatively as having been due to situational (not dispositional) factors; there is little or no threat to their self-concept, and dissonance is therefore less likely to be evoked. These differing sources and resultant levels of dissonance should produce larger self-prophecy effects for low (vs. high) self-monitors.
EXPERIMENT 1 Method
Design, Sample, and Procedure. The experiment employed a 2 (self-monitoring: low vs. high) # 2 (self-prophecy: control vs. self-prediction) between-participants design.
The study was conducted in a behavioral laboratory in groups of up to 20 U.S. undergraduate participants (N p ) receiving course credit for participation. Upon entering 125 the lab, participants completed the self-monitoring scale and the prediction survey, followed by an unrelated 20-30 min. filler task. Participants then completed the dependent measure-commitment to participate in a health and fitness assessment offered by their university ). The self-prophecy manipulation followed 14.47 p ! .001 procedures used in multiple published studies (e.g., Sprott et al. 2003) , with participants randomly assigned to control ( ) and self-prediction ( ) conditions. In both n p 59 n p 64 conditions, participants completed a series of predictions, including the choice of transportation from an airport, selection of a restaurant in Europe, and response to observing shoplifting. The self-prophecy (or control) manipulation always appeared as the second prediction on the survey. In the self-prophecy condition, participants were provided with the following:
A health and fitness assessment is locally available to you. The assessment will evaluate your overall physical fitness and health and is offered free of charge to you as a student at the university you attend.
Q. Do you predict that: a. You will not participate in the health and fitness assessment. b. You will participate in the health and fitness assessment.
Response options were counterbalanced. In the control condition, the fitness assessment prediction was replaced by a prediction regarding tipping at a restaurant after poor service.
Dependent Measure. Following Sprott et al. (2003 , participants were informed of the opportunity to take part in a free health and fitness assessment via a memo provided at the end of the experimental session. The memo, on university health and wellness services letterhead, described the nature of the assessment: "The health and fitness assessment provides individuals with a clear picture of their overall physical well-being and is based on a variety of measures of healthfulness. The assessment takes approximately 15 minutes. The assessment program is free of charge to members of [the university] including students, faculty and staff." After this description, participants were asked to indicate their willingness to participate in the assessment. The primary dependent variable appearing on the memo asked participants, "Are you interested in participating in the health and fitness assessment?" Response options of "yes" and "no" were counterbalanced. Scheduling and contact information was requested; participants committing to the assessment had to complete this information in order to be considered valid respondents (two participants indicating a commitment were dropped for failure to provide contact information). It is noteworthy that, while the current research employs a behavioral intention measure, prior research has documented self-prediction effects on actual behavior at two different health clubs (Spangenberg 1997; .
Results
There was an overall influence of self-prediction on participants' commitment to the health and fitness assessment ( , ; ). There was higher 2 x (123) p 6.09 p p .01 r p .22 commitment among those making a self-prediction (46.9%) compared with those making a control prediction (25.4%). As hypothesized and depicted in figure 1 , the effect of selfprophecy remained (and actually strengthened) for participants low in self-monitoring ( , ; 2 x (64) p 9.23 p p .002 ), and there was no effect of self-prediction for parr p .38 ticipants high in self-monitoring ( , ; 2 x (59) p 0.12 p p .73 ). r p .05 Discussion Experiment 1 provides support for our proposition that self-monitoring moderates the effectiveness of self-prophecy. In particular, people low in self-monitoring were more susceptible to the effects of self-prediction regarding a socially normative behavior than were those high in self-monitoring. This effect is replicated in experiment 2, using a different context with a new sample. Independent Variables. As in experiment 1, participants were classified using the Lennox and Wolfe (1984) scale ( ) based on a median split as low ( a p .77 M p , ) or high ( , ) self-monitors 3.16 n p 37 M p 3.79 n p 49 ( , ). Participants were also randomly t(84) p 11.52 p ! .001 assigned to either a control ( ) or a self-prediction n p 42 ( ) condition; the only difference in materials from n p 44 experiment 1 was the prediction in the self-prophecy condition, which read:
Nonprofit organizations often rely upon donations from people in order to serve society. You receive a request from the American Cancer Society and you are asked if you would donate a few hours of your time to the organization.
Q. Do you predict that: a. You will donate a few hours of your time to the American Cancer Society. b. You will not donate a few hours of your time to the American Cancer Society.
Response options were counterbalanced.
Dependent Measure. The focal variable was participants' willingness to make a donation of their time to the American Cancer Society. After a filler task, participants were presented with a memo from the American Cancer Society describing the nature of the organization and work associated with those donating their time: "Volunteers provide a variety of valuable services to the American Cancer Society including: staff of local offices; coordinating Relay for Life activities; operate informational booths at events." At the end of the memo, participants were asked, "Will you donate a few hours of your time to assist the American Cancer Society in your community?" Response options of "yes" and "no" were counterbalanced. Scheduling and contact information (phone and e-mail) were requested from those indicating that they were interested in donating time (lacking contact information, one participant was dropped).
There was no significant influence of self-prediction on participants' willingness to donate time to the American Cancer Society ( , ; ), nor was 2 x (86) p 1.99 p p .16 r p .15 there an effect of self-prophecy for those scoring high in self-monitoring ( , ; ). As the-2 x (49) p .00 p p .99 r p .00 oretically predicted, however, there was a significant effect of self-prediction for participants low in self-monitoring ( , ; ). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our experiments demonstrate, across two distinct normative behaviors, that the level of a person's self-monitoring moderates the efficacy of self-prophecy as an influence technique. In particular, low self-monitors are more likely to manifest a self-prophecy effect than are high self-monitors. Results of the current research are interpretable within a dissonance paradigmatic understanding of self-prophecy (although process-level evidence of this interpretation should be provided by future research). In particular, prior research has shown that making a selfprediction regarding the performance of a socially normative behavior invokes dissonance (in the form of cognitive discomfort), thereby motivating future behavior change that would otherwise have been less likely to occur. Dissonance is likely to arise from inconsistent cognitive elements, including the norm about what one should do regarding a behavior and self-knowledge about conformity to the norm, which may take the form of memories of specific episodes or a generalization (e.g., "As a rule, I usually . . . "). Given that few behave in normatively appropriate ways 100% of the time, people should often experience dissonance when made aware of a discrepancy between self-knowledge and normative prescription. When subsequently confronted with a relevant behavioral opportunity, evoked dissonance motivates norm-appropriate behavior. The self-concept interpretation of dissonance (Aronson 1968 (Aronson , 1992 holds that dissonance is motivational because inconsistency in actions and thoughts confronts a person's view of himself or herself as a moral and competent person. Our interpretation of the current findings is that the self-concept of low self-monitors is confronted by the prediction request because it is these people whose behavior is internally based or driven, in contrast to high self-monitors, whose behavior is externally driven and who are therefore less likely to be threatened by the prediction. Thus, our research adds new empirical evidence for a theory-relevant boundary condition to our understanding of self-prophecy.
Self-Prophecy and Related Research
Self-prophecy appears to share a domain with mere measurement, a phenomenon wherein behavioral shifts are elicited by measuring purchase intentions (e.g., Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996; Morwitz, Johnson, and Schmittlein 1993) and recently customer satisfaction (Dholakia and Morwitz 2002) . While these effects at first glance may appear similar (i.e., behavior change occurs after asking a person to consider what s/he will do in the future), close examination of published empirical findings reveals salient differences. An obvious difference between the two streams of research is the much larger effect size associated with self-prophecy (cf. Spangenberg and Greenwald 1999) as compared with mere measurement. Another notable difference is that selfprophecy has focused exclusively on socially normative behaviors, whereas mere measurement has examined various (nonnormative) consumption-oriented behaviors such as the purchase of consumer goods (e.g., Morwitz et al. 1993 ). This contextual difference may be a potential explanation for the larger effect sizes associated with self-prophecy. Likely the most important distinction, however, is found in the theoretical mechanisms thought to underlie the respective effects. Recent empirical evidence suggests different theoretical explanations for the effects-namely, cognitive dissonance for self-prophecy and attitude accessibility for mere measurement. While mere-measurement researchers have empirically supported an attitude accessibility explanation (Morwitz and Fitzsimons 2004) , this account has been eliminated as an explanation for self-prophecy in several studies by scholars providing evidence for a dissonancebased process . Thus, although a prima facie relationship is apparent, methodological differences and empirical evidence argue that self-prophecy is a phenomenon perhaps distinct from mere measurement, with clearly separate theoretical underpinnings.
Future Research
Future research initiatives are clearly motivated by the present studies. Extensions of the current research might include a study similar to those reported in this article that assesses cognitive processes (e.g., cognitive discomfort; Elliot and Devine 1994) in the context of self-prophecy and self-monitoring. This would eliminate a possible rival explanation for the current findings that low self-monitors may simply hold stronger social norms than do high self-monitors (cf. Sprott et al. 2003) .
While research finds self-monitoring to moderate the effectiveness of a persuasive message (e.g., DeBono 1985), our work is the first to demonstrate that self-monitoring moderates the effectiveness of a social influence technique. Considering prior research on self-monitoring and consumption may usefully extend our reported effects. In particular, it has been demonstrated that during product evaluation, high (vs. low) self-monitors are more likely to be influenced by country-of-origin information (DeBono and Rubin 1995), packaging (Debono, Leavitt, and Backus 2003) , and image-oriented advertisements (Snyder and DeBono 1985) . Efficacy of self-prediction may therefore be enhanced for high self-monitors by emphasizing the social-adjustive aspects of the situation. That is, a self-prediction emphasizing the importance of the focal normative behavior for peers may allow for a self-prophecy effect to emerge for high self-monitors (DeBono and Edmonds 1989).
Although boundaries for self-prophecy are being defined, more research is required to further delineate conditions under which self-predictions are more or less effective. One opportunity includes examination of conditions under which self-predictions are made. In most published self-prophecy research, people make anonymous self-predictions on a survey. If predictions were administered interpersonally, varying the credibility or expertise of the source could alter normative aspects of particular behaviors and thereby alter effectiveness of the technique. For example, a medical doctor asking a patient to make a self-prediction regarding fu-ture plans to exercise may increase the likelihood of behavioral change relative to the prediction being administered by someone with less expertise. Another likely moderator relates to the nature of the focal behavior for which prediction is made. Behavior-based differences could relate to people's level of (perceived) control over the predicted behavior. Prior research has typically focused on behaviors under the control (at least partially) of the person completing the prediction; socially nonnormative behaviors under less personal control (e.g., addictive or compulsive behaviors) are worthy of investigation in order to determine the efficacy of self-prediction in these contexts.
Future research aimed at clarifying and understanding the theoretical (dis)similarities between self-prophecy and mere measurement is also warranted. In addition to differences between the paradigms with regard to focal behavior types and prediction versus intention measures, there exists a clear divergence regarding theoretical explanations and evidence (or lack thereof) as to why these effects occur. As noted previously, we currently believe that these two effects are likely distinct; existing theoretical evidence and significant difference in the average observed effect sizes are only two pieces of evidence justifying our belief. Only research investigating both techniques in the same experimental design with similar behaviors (potentially with process measures) can hope to resolve the emerging, and potentially controversial, theoretical issues surrounding these observed effects.
Conclusion
The social influence of requesting self-prediction has important practical implications for profit and nonprofit enterprises interested in affecting choice and behavior. A substantial amount of research has clearly documented real-world behavioral effects of this phenomenon. A clear benefit of the self-prophecy technique is its simplicity: a question followed by a simple "yes" or "no" response elicits behavioral change in a normative direction. When compared with more elaborate social influence strategies like the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) , the benefits of self-prediction with regard to changing behavior seem self-evident. The current research provides further evidence that normative behaviors are changed after making a self-prediction, in this case with the strongest effects for those who are low (as compared with high) in self-monitoring. Our findings emphasize a fundamental premise that should be kept in mind by influence agents desiring to effect normative behavior via self-prophecy: a self-prediction needs to confront the self-concept of the person making the prediction, as it does with low selfmonitors.
[Dawn Iacobucci served as editor and Laura Peracchio served as associate editor for this article.] 
